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The UK’s departure from the European Union (EU) will 
profoundly affect European integration. Although 
many have lamented the blow that this presents to the 
EU, Brexit also presents a window of opportunity for it 
to consider its reform options after the UK’s exit, 
including policies related to Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). Although the UK famously declined 
participation in EMU and retained the pound as its 
currency, this policy brief argues that Brexit will affect 
the future trajectory of EMU in several ways. First, it 
will place pressure on euro-outs to adopt the euro as 
their currency. Second, it will alter existing alliances 
within the EU, including between the euro-ins and 
euro-outs. Third, Brexit will prompt changes in EU 
legislation to account for the departure of the UK, thus 
opening the door to reforms to strengthen European 
financial market integration and possibly even fiscal 
cooperation. 
The UK and EMU-related policies: What are the 
stakes? 
The UK served as an important advocate for the 
interests of the euro-outs as the euro area pressed 
ahead with further integration during the sovereign 
debt crisis. For example, the decision to move to 
banking union shifted financial integration from a single 
market issue (concerning the EU-28) to one in which the 
euro area deepened integration through centralized 
banking supervision. The UK government pursued a 
double-majority voting system in the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) to prevent the euro-outs from being 
overwhelmed by euro area decisions in banking. Article 
3.6 of the 2014 revised voting procedure requires a 
double majority in that decisions are adopted after a 
simple majority of euro-ins and a simple majority of 
euro-outs. 
Such agreements protecting euro-outs could be 
jeopardized by Brexit. When the largest euro-out leaves 
the EU, the remaining countries are relatively small 
economies. Sweden and Poland are the largest euro-
outs in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), ranking 
7th and 8th respectively out of the EU-28. Post-Brexit, the 
euro-outs would comprise less than 20% of the EU-27’s 
GDP. For those remaining euro-outs, the division with 
the euro area could harden. The euro-ins already can 
outvote euro-outs under the qualified majority voting 
rules introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, and Brexit has 
intensified interest in multi-speed integration. In 
February 2017, the Benelux countries declared that in 
their vision of the future of Europe, ’different paths of 
Executive Summary 
> Although the United Kingdom obtained an opt-
out from Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
its departure from the European Union (EU) will 
have important effects on EMU’s development. 
> These effects will be felt through three primary 
channels:  
 First, Brexit will create more pressure on 
the euro-outs to adopt the euro; 
 Second, it will alter existing alliances within 
the EU that by extension will affect the 
trajectory of euro area integration;  
 Finally, EU legislative reforms post-Brexit 
open up windows of opportunity to make 
the euro area more robust. 
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integration and enhanced cooperation could provide 
for effective responses to challenges that affect 
member states in different ways’ (Michel 2017). Among 
the Commission White Paper scenarios (European 
Commission 2017a), a multi-speed Europe emerged 
quickly as the favoured option of Germany, France, Italy 
and Spain. While then French President Hollande 
deemed the idea of a multi-speed Europe ‘necessary’, 
others called it ‘dangerous’ (Barker et al. 2017) in that it 
could exacerbate the existing divisions between EU 
member states over issues like the euro, Schengen, and 
migration and create a second-class EU citizenship. 
Bulgaria and Romania, for example, expressed concern 
that Brexit would lead to their marginalization (Möller 
& Oliver 2014). If multi-speed Europe emerges as the 
preferred integration path, some euro-outs likely would 
reconsider euro area membership. Most have accepted 
the need for the euro area to intensify integration to be 
viable in the long-term, which would exacerbate the 
notions of a ‘core’ and a ‘periphery’ in the EU.  
Moreover, Brexit will reconfigure the current alliances 
in European financial integration, which could have an 
impact on capital markets union (CMU). France, Italy, 
Spain’s ‘market-shaping’ coalition seeking ‘financial 
stability and consumer protection, as well as the 
protection of national industry’ conflicted with the UK, 
the Netherlands and Nordic countries’ ‘market-making’ 
coalition prizing ‘competition and market efficiency’ 
(Quaglia 2010: 8). Brexit deprives the latter of its largest 
and most influential member and the largest 
beneficiary of CMU, as the UK, Luxembourg, Sweden, 
Ireland and the Netherlands were its strongest 
advocates; Germany, France, Italy and Austria viewed 
CMU more cautiously, while the Central and Eastern 
European states were unlikely to benefit substantially 
based on the presence (or lack) of a large, non-bank-
based financial sector (Quaglia et al. 2016). Questions 
have even been raised if Brexit will affect EU support for 
the completion of CMU (Ständer 2016).  
Additionally, one cannot expect EU legislation to remain 
static. One area that has already attracted much 
attention is the ability for UK clearing houses to 
continue to handle euro-denominated transactions. 
The UK’s clearing houses have a daily turnover of over 
€927 billion. The European Central Bank (ECB) already 
tried to shift the settlement of euro-denominated 
transactions to the euro area in its 2011 policy 
framework. The UK brought the case to the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) on the grounds that it contravened 
single market provisions on the free movement of 
capital, services and establishment by discriminating on 
the basis of location. The ECJ ruled in favour of the UK, 
and the ECB arranged a swap line with the Bank of 
England to deal with potential liquidity shortages. Post-
Brexit, this ECJ ruling and ECB swap agreement will no 
longer apply as the UK will not be part of the single 
market. A May 2017 press release declared the EU’s 
intention to move clearing activities to the EU as part of 
its plans for the reform of the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) (European 
Commission 2017b). 
Policy Implications of Brexit for EMU 
The aforementioned shifting of alliances and 
concomitant changes to EU legislation post-Brexit 
provide a window of opportunity for the EU to improve 
its legislation and governance. This would not only help 
the EU deal with Brexit, but would also strengthen the 
still-vulnerable EMU architecture . 
First, Brexit demands a reassessment of the legislation 
and supervision of financial markets. For example, CMU 
could be furthered through the expansion of the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to 
include supervision, as foreseen by the Commission’s 
2017 reflection paper on the future of EMU (European 
Commission 2017c). Although Brexit necessitates some 
shifts (like the move of the European Banking Authority 
out of London) and makes others likely (such as the 
rules governing euro clearing), this should not be done 
in a way that provokes unnecessary market disruption. 
Markets have had a relatively benign reaction to Brexit 
thus far, but this could change quickly if Brexit turns 
hard and sudden. The euro area is still dependent on 
London financial markets, and it would be in the 
interest of both sides to find an interim agreement to 
smooth the transition.  
Second, the EU should try to make the adoption of the 
euro more attractive to the euro-outs. Brexit will trigger 
additional legislative changes in the EU that could have 
a negative impact on the euro-outs once their largest 
member leaves the club, which could cause them to 
reconsider membership. There are precedents for the 
EU easing participation in monetary integration (e.g. the 
creation of the Cohesion Fund that co-financed 
infrastructure projects in Greece, Ireland, Spain and 
Portugal to assist their fulfilment of EMU’s convergence 
criteria), and such support could help overcome the 
political and economic obstacles to EMU membership in 
some countries. 
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Third, Brexit will prompt the reform of the multiannual 
financial framework. While building a euro area fiscal 
capacity seems like a distant possibility given German 
opposition, the time is ripe to consider reforms that 
would put the EU in a better position to deal with the 
economic issues that accompany Brexit. For example, in 
the US risk-sharing by private actors plays a larger role 
in stabilization than centralized fiscal policy. This 
example could also be followed in the EU. Nevertheless, 
a stronger fiscal underpinning is needed in the EU to 
move forward with banking union through joint deposit 
guarantees. This would also encourage greater private 
risk-sharing and make EMU more robust. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the fact that the UK does not use the euro, 
Brexit will have important implications for EMU’s 
future. The UK’s significant financial sector and the loss 
of its budgetary contributions will lead to numerous EU 
reforms in the wake of its exit. The EU should take 
advantage of this. Encouraging the adoption of the euro 
by current euro-outs is a step in the right direction. 
While financial sector reforms are inevitable, the EU 
should be mindful of the benefits that London’s 
financial markets have provided in the past and not 
make Brexit unnecessarily disruptive. Finally, the EU 
should use post-Brexit reforms as an opportunity to 
strengthen the euro area and make it more robust 
against future crises. 
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